科研之友
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摘要
In the first part of the essay, I describe phenomenologically the transition between dreaming and wakefulness in order to determine whether a reliable dream memory can result from this transition (after all, we have no evidence of our dreams other than our memories). This description shows that this is indeed the case and indicates the conditions under which we can apprehend dreams without imposing on them meanings they do not have. These conditions, or ※attitude§ is theoretically supported by a negative phenomenology of dreams, namely, a phenomenology which describes dreams by stating what they are not. This first part also explains why we usually forget our dreams and accounts for the cases in which we are conscious of dreaming. In the second part I sketch out a negative phenomenology. This phenomenology shows that the attributions consisting in qualifying dreams, or assigning them hidden originary meanings in need of deciphering (or interpreting), or their own teleology, as well as certain positive attributions (i.e. those that start by affirming: ※dreams are such and such§) are nonsensical. The conclusions demonstrate the continuity between the ※threshold or transitional phenomenology§ developed in the first part, and the negative phenomenology developed in the second. En la primera parte del ensayo, describo fenomenol車gicamente la transici車n entre el so ar y la vigilia, a fin de determinar si de este umbral puede resultar un recuerdo-de-sue o fiable (pues no tenemos otra evidencia sobre los sue os sino nuestros recuerdos). La descripci車n muestra que s赤 y se ala a la vez las condiciones requeridas para aprehender los sue os de modo de no inocularles determinaciones que les son ajenas. La ※actitud§ as赤 sugerida encuentra su expresi車n te車rica en una fenomenolog赤a negativa de los sue os, es decir, una fenomenolog赤a que s車lo los describe por aquello que no son. Esta primera parte permite, adem芍s, explicar el olvido de los sue os y los casos en los que se tiene conciencia de estar so ando. La segunda parte es un esbozo de fenomenolog赤a negativa; muestra que aquellas atribuciones que consisten en calificar a los sue os, o adjudicarles sentidos ocultos y originarios que requieren ser descifrados (o interpretados), o una teleolog赤a propia, son, al igual que ciertas atribuciones positivas (i.e. que parten por decir: ※Los sue os son as赤 y as赤§), sinsentidos. Las conclusiones dejan ver la continuidad entre la ※fenomenolog赤a del umbral§ de la primera parte, y la fenomenolog赤a negativa de los sue os, de la segunda.
