摘要
The US Senate Committee that investigated the Enron disaster assessed the role of analysts. At issue was whether analysts misled the public by ignoring warning signals that included a high proportion of non-operating income. Non-operating income derives from secondary activities like investments, but operating income is from the primary business activities like manufacturing. While the analysts admitted their limited ability to forecast Enron*s earnings, they denied any intentional deceit and claimed that they were misled by Enron. This study asks whether analysts* ability to predict earnings is generally negatively associated with the proportion of non-operating income. The rationale is to determine whether the limited ability of analysts to predict earnings for Enron was an isolated incident or a pervasive one that applies to other firms. If pervasive, then another such disaster could occur without a warning from analysts. First, I examine the incentives for firms to resort more to non-operating income rather than focus on Operating income. Then I examine the association between analysts* forecast attributes and the ratio of nonoperating to operating income. The results show that non-operating income and operating income are negatively associated, suggesting that firms use non-operating income to manage their operating results. Also, analysts* forecast inaccuracy and dispersion are positively associated with the ratio of non-operating income to operating income. These results imply that analysts are generally inefficient in predicting earnings of firms with a high proportion of non-operating income.