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摘要
This paper considers a supply chain consisting of one upstream firm (UF) and one downstream firm (DF), which are linked by backward shareholding, in the sense that the DF owns equity shares in the UF. The UF is jointly owned by the DF and other shareholders, and each shareholder has both the control right and the dividend right of the UF. In the setting of joint control, all shareholders have rights to participate in the decision-making of the UF, and establish the decision-making objective for the UF by balancing their different interests. The paper explores the impacts of equity shares held by the DF in the UF, on the supply chain operations, by investigating operating decisions (e.g., pricing decision) of the two firms in the upstream Stackelberg supply chain and the downstream Stackelberg supply chain, respectively. The results show that: In the upstream Stackelberg supply chain, the UF provides the product at the price of the cost, and the supply chain achieves coordination, if and only if the percentage of equity shares held by the DF reaches 50%; in the downstream Stackelberg supply chain, the UF may provide the product at the price of the cost even if the percentage of equity shares held by the DF is lower than 50%, and the supply chain achieves coordination only if the percentage of equity shares held by the DF reaches 50%. ? 2023 Systems Engineering Society of China.
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