Theory for biform games CIS value-based equilibrium strategies [基于CIS值的非合作-合作两型博弈的理论研究]

作者：Nan J.-X.; Wang P.-P.; Li D.-F.^*

来源：Control and Decision, 2020, 35(6): 1427-1434.

DOI：10.13195/j.kzyjc.2018.1166

• Biform game
• CIS value
• Cooperative game
• Noncooperative game

In order to make up for the deficiency of the solution of biform games proposed by Brandenburger and Stuart, the center of imputation set value (CIS value) is used to solve the cooperation game in the second stage of the biform games, and then pure strategy Nash equilibrium solutions of Non-cooperative games are obtained. Furthermore, the existence conditions of biform games based on the CIS value are proved. The proposed solution of biform games not only avoids the non-existence and non-uniqueness of the core, but also reduces the existence conditions of the solution of the biform game. The proposed method is suitable for the biform games, when no externalities of characteristic functions are not satisfied. It makes the application of the biform games model more general and provides a new theory for supply chain management and other issues. Finally, numerical examples illustrate the effectiveness and practicality of the proposed model.

• 单位
  电子科技大学